Send our love to Chelsea, Marc and Grandpa. Can’t wait to meet Charlotte.
On Aug 19, 2014 9:22 AM, “H” <hrod17@clintonemail.com> wrote:
Agree but there may be opportunities as the Iraqi piece improves. Also, any idea whose fighters attacked Islamist positions in Tripoli, Libya? Worth analyzing for future purposes.
*From*: John Podesta [mailto:john.podesta@gmail.com]
*Sent*: Tuesday, August 19, 2014 09:19 AM
*To*: H
*Subject*: Re: Here’s what I mentioned Hit send too soon.
Meant to say Syria elements are vexing.
On Aug 19, 2014 9:17 AM, “John Podesta” <john.podesta@gmail.com> wrote:
> I think we are headed down this path in Iraq, but the Syria elements are
> On Aug 17, 2014 3:50 PM, “H” <hrod17@clintonemail.com> wrote: >
>> Note: Sources include Western intelligence, US intelligence and sources
>> in the region.
>>
>> 1. With all of its tragic aspects, the advance of ISIL
>> through Iraq gives the U.S. Government an opportunity to change the way it
>> deals with the chaotic security situation in North Africa and the Middle
>> East. The most important factor in this matter is to make use of
>> intelligence resources and Special Operations troops in an aggressive
>> manner, while avoiding the old school solution, which calls for more
>> traditional military operations. In Iraq it is important that we engage
>> ISIL using the resources of the Peshmerga fighters of the Kurdish Regional
>> Government (KRG), and what, if any, reliable units exist in the Iraqi
>> Army. The Peshmerga commanders are aggressive hard fighting troops, who
>> have long standing relationships with CIA officers and Special Forces
>> operators. However, they will need the continued commitment of U.S.
>> personnel to work with them as advisors and strategic planners, the new
>> generation of Peshmerga commanders being largely untested in traditional
>> combat. That said, with this U.S. aid the Kurdish troops can inflict a
>> real defeat on ISIL.
>>
>> 2. It is important that once we engage ISIL, as we have now
>> done in a limited manner, we and our allies should carry on until they are
>> driven back suffering a tangible defeat. Anything short of this will be
>> seen by other fighters in the region, Libya, Lebanon, and even Jordan, as
>> an American defeat. However, if we provide advisors and planners, as well
>> as increased close air support for the Peshmerga, these soldiers can defeat
>> ISIL. They will give the new Iraqi Government a chance to organize itself,
>> and restructure the Sunni resistance in Syria, moving the center of power
>> toward moderate forces like the Free Syrian Army (FSA). In addition to air
>> support, the Peshmerga also need artillery and armored vehicles to deal
>> with the tanks and other heavy equipment captured from the Iraqi army by
>> ISIL.
>>
>> 3. In the past the USG, in an agreement with the Turkish General Staff,
>> did not provide such heavy weapons to the Peshmerga, out of a concern that
>> they would end up in the hands of Kurdish rebels inside of Turkey. The
>> current situation in Iraq, not to mention the political environment in
>> Turkey, makes this policy obsolete. Also this equipment can now be
>> airlifted directly into the KRG zone.
>>
>> 4. Armed with proper equipment, and working with U.S. advisors, the
>> Peshmerga can attack the ISIL with a coordinated assault supported from the
>> air. This effort will come as a surprise to the ISIL, whose leaders
>> believe we will always stop with targeted bombing, and weaken them both in
>> Iraq and inside of Syria. At the same time we should return to plans to
>> provide the FSA, or some group of moderate forces, with equipment that will
>> allow them to deal with a weakened ISIL, and stepped up operations against
>> the Syrian regime. This entire effort should be done with a low profile,
>> avoiding the massive traditional military operations that are at best
>> temporary solutions. While this military/para-military operation is moving
>> forward, we need to use our diplomatic and more traditional intelligence
>> assets to bring pressure on the governments of Qatar and Saudi Arabia,
>> which are providing clandestine financial and logistic support to ISIL and
>> other radical Sunni groups in the region. This effort will be enhanced by
>> the stepped up commitment in the KRG. The Qataris and Saudis will be put
>> in a position of balancing policy between their ongoing competition to
>> dominate the Sunni world and the consequences of serious U.S. pressure. By
>> the same token, the threat of similar, realistic U.S. operations will serve
>> to assist moderate forces in Libya, Lebanon, and even Jordan, where
>> insurgents are increasingly fascinated by the ISIL success in Iraq.
>>
>>6. In the end the situation in Iraq is merely the latest and most
>> dangerous example of the regional restructuring that is taking place across
>> North Africa, all the way to the Turkish border. These developments are
>> important to the U.S. for reasons that often differ from country to
>> country: energy and moral commitment to Iraq, energy issues in Libya, and
>> strategic commitments in Jordan. At the same time, as Turkey moves toward
>> a new, more serious Islamic reality, it will be important for them to
>> realize that we are willing to take serious actions, which can be sustained
>> to protect our national interests. This course of action offers the
>> potential for success, as opposed to large scale, traditional military
>> campaigns, that are too expensive and awkward to maintain over time.
>>
>>
>>7. (Note: A source in Tripoli stated in confidence that when the U.S.
>> Embassy was evacuated, the presence of two U.S. Navy jet fighters over the
>> city brought all fighting to a halt for several hours, as Islamist forces
>> were not certain that these aircraft would not also provide close ground
>> support for moderate government forces.)
>>
>>8. If we do not take the changes needed to make our security
>> policy in the region more realistic, there is a real danger of ISIL
>> veterans moving on to other countries to facilitate operations by Islamist
>> forces. This is already happening in Libya and Egypt, where fighters are
>> returning from Syria to work with local forces. ISIL is only the latest and
>> most violent example of this process. If we don’t act to defeat them in
>> Iraq something even more violent and dangerous will develop. Successful
>> military operations against these very irregular but determined forces can
>> only be accomplished by making proper use of clandestine/special operations
>> resources, in coordination with airpower, and established local allies.
>> There is, unfortunately, a narrow window of opportunity on this issue, as
>> we need to act before an ISIL state becomes better organized and reaches
>> into Lebanon and Jordan.
>>
>>
>> 9. (Note: It is important to keep in mind that as a result of
>> this policy there probably will be concern in the Sunni regions of Iraq and
>> the Central Government regarding the possible expansion of KRG controlled
>> territory. With advisors in the Peshmerga command we can reassure the
>> concerned parties that, in return for increase autonomy, the KRG will not
>> exclude the Iraqi Government from participation in the management of the
>> oil fields around Kirkuk, and the Mosel Dam hydroelectric facility. At the
>> same time we will be able to work with the Peshmerga as they pursue ISIL
>> into disputed areas of Eastern Syria, coordinating with FSA troops who can
>> move against ISIL from the North. This will make certain Basher al Assad
>> does not gain an advantage from these operations. Finally, as it now
>> appears the U.S. is considering a plan to offer contractors as advisors to
>> the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, we will be in a position to coordinate more
>> effectively between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi Army.)
>>
>>
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