Development of the Auxiliary

Martial fantasies of battlefield valor and guerrilla glory in shoot-outs and throat-slitting sentry neutralizations aside, the ultimate success or failure of a resistance movement does not reside solely on the tactical prowess of the scared, cold guys with guns hiding out in the forests and mountains (although they are important). All the way back, through the dim, misty curtains of time, to the Maccabees, the success of a resistance movement has depended in the long term, on its ability to maintain the support functions of an active auxiliary organization.

Regardless of the initial political persuasions of the local civilian populace, in order to be ultimately successful, a resistance must gain the willing support of the civilian populace, and be able to organize that support into a coordinated, functional effort. While the active paramilitary guerrilla force is off, freezing and starving at Valley Forge, the task of developing and organizing that civilian support falls on the auxiliary (see what I did there?)

(We who are active in the Liberty movement, especially many of us in the blogosphere, like to throw out the III% label, perhaps too quickly in many cases. The reality is, while yes, only three percent of the colonials actively took the field against the British Empire at any one time, the division of support between the warring elements was closer to thirds: one-third supported the rebellion, one-third supported the Crown, and one-third just didn’t give a shit, as long as their kids were housed and fed. After all, neither Thomas Jefferson nor Benjamin Franklin ever took the field of battle during the conflict….were they somehow less dedicated to the Cause?


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