Have You Noticed – Part 3

This article will outline the impact on construction/housing/mortgages if the administration deports illegal aliens.

From Grok:

The estimated number of illegal immigrants in the United States that could potentially be subject to deportation varies according to different sources. According to recent analyses, the unauthorized immigrant population in the U.S. was estimated to be around 10.99 million in 2022, with some sources suggesting this number has stabilized after previous growth periods. However, other reports indicate a higher number; for instance, the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) estimated about 16.8 million illegal aliens resided in the U.S. as of June 2023.

Additionally, discussions on X mention numbers ranging from 11 million to 20 million, with some posts suggesting Trump’s administration might aim for deporting between 1 to 2 million, with an acknowledgment that going beyond that would require significant additional resources.

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Grok is programmed to state that deportation will have a negative impact in the long term due to a lack of skilled workers in the construction industry. I rephrased my question:

If supply rises, construction will be decreased so demand for workers should not be a significant impact

Grok:

Your point introduces an interesting economic principle, suggesting that if supply rises due to deportations, the need for new construction might decrease, thereby reducing the demand for construction workers. Here’s a more nuanced analysis considering this perspective:

Initial Impact on Housing Supply:

  • Increased Availability: If one million people are deported, the immediate effect would indeed be an increase in housing availability due to reduced demand. This could lead to:
    • Lower occupancy rates in rental units.
    • Potentially lower home prices in areas with significant immigrant populations, as the market adjusts to the new supply-demand equilibrium.

Construction and Labor Demand:

  • Reduced Construction Needs: With more housing units available, the urgency for new construction might decrease. This scenario would:
    • Lower immediate demand for construction workers, potentially alleviating concerns about labor shortages in construction in the short term.
    • However, this assumes no other factors like population growth, urban expansion, or replacement of aging infrastructure demand new construction.
  • Maintenance and Renovation: Even if new construction decreases, there would still be a need for maintenance and renovation of existing structures. The impact here would be:
    • If undocumented immigrants, who often perform these roles, are less available, costs could rise due to higher wages for remaining workers or the need to train new workers.
    • Over time, maintenance might not keep pace with needs, potentially leading to a decline in housing quality or increased costs for property owners.

Long-term Market Dynamics:

  • Economic Activity: If the economy contracts due to the loss of consumer spending by those deported (immigrants contribute to both labor and consumer markets), or if there’s a significant economic backlash, housing demand might not recover quickly, keeping construction needs low.
  • Construction Sector Adaptation: The construction industry might adapt by:
    • Increasing wages to attract remaining workers.
    • Automating more processes or using more prefabricated elements.
    • Training or hiring from other sectors or underemployed local populations, though this might take time.
  • Housing Market Equilibrium: If construction demand decreases significantly, eventually, the market might reach a new equilibrium where new construction resumes to meet any residual or new demand, but this could take years, depending on economic conditions.

Policy and Market Reactions:

  • Government Policy: Housing policy, zoning laws, or incentives for construction could shift to address the new reality, either by encouraging more building or repurposing existing structures.
  • Investment and Speculation: Investors might enter the market to buy up properties at lower prices, potentially stabilizing or increasing demand for construction for renovations or conversions.

Conclusion:

  • Short-term vs. Long-term: In the short term, your premise holds; less demand for new housing could lead to less need for construction workers. However, the long-term impact on the housing market and construction labor could be more complex, involving:
    • Potential labor shortages if the economy rebounds or if other sectors start competing for labor.
    • A possible degradation in property maintenance without the existing workforce.
  • Market Adjustment: The construction sector would need to adjust, possibly through higher wages, automation, or shifting workforce dynamics. The exact impact would depend on how quickly and effectively the market adapts to these changes.

Thus, while the immediate effect might reduce construction activity and labor demand, the longer-term implications on housing supply, quality, and labor could still be significant if not managed strategically.

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I believe we will have a period of several years before constraints in construction become problematic. Or I should say more problematic, since the cost of construction coupled with the low quality of new construction have not been addressed. Neither have the costs of housing insurance, mortgage interest, increased property taxes and permitting requirements been considered.

It is probable that the commercial real estate market will implode as outlined previously. The result will impact banks, reduce rents and impact property taxes. Since supply is increased, new office construction will decrease AND banks will be reluctant to finance new construction without more collateral and higher loan interests.

Depending on how many people are deported (and self-deported), residential construction will also be impacted. Rents will decrease and demand for new housing will decrease for multiple reasons:

  1. Interest rates
  2. Construction costs will be increased to rebuild housing in Florida, WNC/Tennessee and Los Angeles.
  3. There will be a shortage of skilled labor as people are deported. How much of an impact will be dependent on the number of people deported and the amount of skilled American labor that has not been used due to cheaper illegal labor.
  4. The country may go into a recession or worse. We still have out of control spending on all government levels.

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I want to concentrate on the shortage of skilled labor. Why are people saying we need illegal aliens for the construction industry? Let’s look at this as an opportunity to rebuild our country with Americans. Consider how we got to this point and it starts with education.

Our educational facilities have failed our children and our country. Miserably failed. Consider the point that all math taught in grades K-5 can be taught in six weeks at one hour per day (30 hours). How long would it take to train someone to frame a house?

From Grok:

Estimated Times:

Basic Framing Skills:

  • With no prior experience: 3 to 6 months of intensive, daily practice could get someone to understand basic framing techniques, though this would be under ideal conditions with good mentorship.
  • With some construction background: 1 to 3 months to learn framing specifically, assuming they already know about tools, safety, and basic construction principles.

Proficiency in Framing:

  • No experience: Likely 1 to 2 years to become proficient, including dealing with various scenarios, understanding blueprints, and handling complex or custom framing projects.
  • With construction experience: 6 months to a year, considering they’re adapting existing skills to framing.

Mastery:

For someone to be considered a master framer, capable of handling any framing job with efficiency and innovation, it might take 3 to 5 years or more, combining experience with continued learning and adaptation to new construction methods or materials.

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If our children would be taught basic skills such as reading, writing and mathematics, I know that Americans can learn how to frame a house in a reasonable amount of time. Or plumbing, electrical, HVAC or grading. We have to invest in America and that means investing in our children. I want to qualify that statement: we should only invest in our children who want to succeed. In order to succeed, we have to reward people who work with a fair wage and working conditions. In order to succeed, we have to reignite the concept of the American dream.

For anyone who believes that Americans cannot rebuild this country:

The Deep State will not go easily into the night and traitors like Mitch McConnell, Susan Collins and Lisa Murkowski are proof that their goal is to join the Deep State to destroy the nation. We need to come together and realize that tough times are here and will get worse. It’s time to make lemonade and rebuild our country using Americans.

Posted in Editorial | 23 Comments

Have You Noticed – Part 2

This article is a continuation of an article posted concerning the apparent impact of Donald Trump’s administration concerning deportation of illegal aliens. I recommend people read both the first article and the comments.

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This will be a series of articles which will focus on the probable impact of deporting illegal aliens from the United States. I will not consider any impact from foreign wars, pandemics or natural disasters.

Let’s start with a refresher of the CRE (Commercial Real Estate) market:

Grok: What is the exposure of US banks to the downturn of CRE

The exposure of U.S. banks to the downturn in Commercial Real Estate (CRE) has been a significant concern, especially with the confluence of high interest rates, changing work patterns, and economic recovery challenges. Here’s an analysis based on the latest available data:

Exposure Levels:

  • Large Banks: Major banks like JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, and Citigroup have relatively lower exposure to CRE compared to regional and smaller banks. For example, JPMorgan’s exposure is around 61% of its capital, which is considered manageable. However, even these banks have set aside significant reserves for potential CRE loan losses. Wells Fargo, for instance, reported an increase in provisions for CRE loan losses.
  • Regional and Small Banks: These institutions hold a significantly higher exposure to CRE. Over 60 of the largest banks in the U.S. have CRE exposure greater than 300% of their total equity, with some exceeding 500% or even 600%. Banks like Flagstar Bank and Zion Bancorporation are among those with the highest exposure ratios. Small banks collectively hold around 70% of all CRE loans in the U.S., making them particularly vulnerable.
  • Quantitative Data:
    • Over 1,871 banks have CRE exposures exceeding 300% of their equity, with 1,112 above 400%, 551 over 500%, and 243 over 600%.
    • Specifically, around 311 banks are at risk of failure in a severe downturn scenario, with the majority being community banks.

Risks and Indicators:

  • Refinancing Challenges: Many CRE loans are five-year balloon mortgages, leading to refinancing needs in 2025 for loans originated in 2020. With rising interest rates, refinancing these at higher rates could lead to defaults or distressed sales, especially in the office sector where demand has decreased due to remote work trends.
  • Office Sector: This segment is particularly stressed, with high vacancy rates and property values in some areas falling below loan amounts. Approximately 44% of office loans are in negative equity, where current property values are less than outstanding loan balances.
  • Regulatory and Market Concerns: The FDIC and other regulatory bodies view any CRE exposure above 300% of equity as risky. There’s also concern about indirect exposure through lines of credit to nonbank lenders, which regulators have little visibility into.

Potential Outcomes:

  • Loan Loss Reserves: Banks have increased their provisions for credit losses, with some like Wells Fargo setting aside additional capital specifically for CRE. However, reports suggest that reserves might not cover all potential losses, especially if market conditions worsen significantly.
  • Bank Failures: There’s a real risk of bank failures, particularly among smaller institutions with high CRE exposure. The failure of banks like Silicon Valley Bank has heightened awareness and caution.
  • Market Impact: A downturn could lead to tighter lending conditions, potentially exacerbating economic slowdowns or recessions. It might also lead to a banking panic if depositors start pulling money from banks with high CRE exposure.

Mitigation and Strategy:

  • Diversification: Banks with diversified portfolios across different property types are less vulnerable.
  • Asset Sales: Some banks are offloading CRE portfolios or reducing exposure through sales to private equity or other investors.
  • Regulatory Scrutiny: Increased oversight from banking regulators is expected to ensure banks manage their CRE risk appropriately.

The exposure to CRE downturn represents a significant risk for U.S. banks, particularly those with high concentrations in this sector. The situation requires careful monitoring, especially as loan maturities approach and market conditions evolve.

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Grok: Couple the above answer and then couple the impact of the US government flooding the market with their excess office buildings

Combining the already high exposure of U.S. banks to the downturn in Commercial Real Estate (CRE) with the U.S. government’s decision to sell its excess office buildings could amplify the challenges in several ways:

Increased Market Supply:

  • Supply Shock: The government’s decision to sell off significant office space would further increase the supply in an already oversaturated market, particularly for office real estate. This could lead to a more pronounced drop in property values, especially in markets where federal buildings are concentrated.
  • Depressed Prices: With more properties entering the market, prices could fall even further than currently projected, impacting both property owners and lenders. This would be particularly detrimental to banks with high CRE exposure, as the collateral value for their loans diminishes.

Impact on Banks:

  • Increased Loan Defaults: Lower property values due to this increased supply could push more CRE loans into negative equity, increasing default risks. Banks might face significant charge-offs or need to restructure loans, both of which would affect their financial health.
  • Provision for Losses: Banks would likely need to increase their provisions for loan losses significantly. Even though some banks have already done this, the additional pressure from government sales might not have been fully accounted for in existing provisions.
  • Capital Adequacy: With CRE loans making up a large portion of their portfolios, particularly for regional and small banks, a drop in asset value could strain capital ratios, potentially leading to regulatory interventions or even bank failures if not managed correctly.

Regional Implications:

  • Economic Impact on Localities: Areas with high concentrations of federal buildings might see a localized economic impact. If these buildings are not repurposed or sold to entities that continue to support local economies, there could be job losses or economic downturns in those regions.
  • Opportunities for Diversification: On the flip side, this could provide an opportunity for banks to diversify their portfolios by investing in or financing the conversion of these buildings into new uses like residential, mixed-use, or even industrial spaces if feasible.

Market Dynamics:

  • Investor Behavior: The market might see a shift where investors, including banks, might be more cautious about investing in CRE or might look for opportunities in distressed sales or adaptive reuse projects. Private equity or real estate investment trusts (REITs) might find opportunities in buying these properties at lower prices.
  • Lending Standards: Banks might tighten lending standards further, particularly for CRE, which could slow down new developments or purchases, impacting the broader real estate market.

Government and Policy:

  • Policy Considerations: The government would need to consider the timing and method of these sales to mitigate the impact on the market. Strategies could include phased sales, offering properties for specific repurposing, or providing incentives for developers to buy and convert these buildings.
  • Public Perception: The sale of public assets might face political scrutiny or public backlash, especially if seen as a move to cut government size or if the sales process lacks transparency.

Summary:

The combination of high bank exposure to CRE downturns and the government’s sale of excess office buildings could exacerbate market pressures, potentially leading to:

  • More significant CRE value drops,
  • Increased bank loan losses or defaults,
  • A potentially slower recovery for the CRE sector,
  • Opportunities for strategic investors in distressed markets.

However, the exact impact would depend on the scale and speed of sales, market absorption rates, and how banks and investors adapt to these new market conditions. Careful policy execution and market monitoring would be crucial to mitigate negative outcomes while capitalizing on potential opportunities for market correction and revitalization.

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We Are Funding Our Own Demise

The current budget for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for Fiscal Year 2025, as proposed, is $62.2 billion in discretionary funding.

The budget for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for Fiscal Year 2025 is proposed to be $11.3 billion.

The budget for U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for Fiscal Year 2025 is proposed to be $19.76 billion.

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Grok: What is the estimated cost in 2024 to provide services to illegal aliens

The estimated cost to provide services to illegal aliens in the United States for the year 2024 has been cited in various sources with different figures:

  • The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) estimated that in 2023, the net cost of illegal immigration to U.S. taxpayers was at least $150.7 billion annually, after accounting for taxes paid by illegal immigrants. This figure includes costs for education, health care, law enforcement, and other services at both federal and state levels. Given the persistence of immigration trends, these costs are likely to continue or escalate into 2024 unless significant policy changes occur.
  • Another report suggested that the total cost could be as high as $182 billion for services related to illegal immigration, considering all federal, state, and local costs without subtracting tax contributions. This indicates a significant financial burden on American taxpayers.
  • Posts on X have also highlighted costs, with some mentioning $451 billion per year as an estimate from the House Committee on Homeland Security, though this figure includes a broader range of costs and is not strictly for 2024 but reflective of ongoing expenditures.

Considering these sources, the estimated cost to provide services to illegal aliens in 2024 could range from at least $150.7 billion to potentially $451 billion, though the exact number would depend on various factors including policy changes, enforcement actions, and the size of the undocumented population.

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Grok did not consider the cost of ESL (English as a second language) in the above costs to illegal aliens:

Given the available data, here’s a reasonable estimation for the cost of ESL programs specifically for illegal aliens:

  • In 2017, FAIR reported that education costs for illegal aliens totaled about $59 billion, with a significant portion of this likely going towards ESL due to the high number of non-English speaking students among this demographic.
  • More recent reports from 2023 and 2024 show an increase in educational expenditures due to the growing number of illegal immigrants, particularly children. For instance, in Illinois, the increase in ESL students since 2019 added over $550 million annually to education costs.
  • Assuming the average cost per ESL student remains significant, and considering the growth in the number of illegal immigrants and their children, a conservative estimate for 2024 might be:
    • Education Costs for Illegal Aliens: $59 billion in 2017, likely increased due to population growth and inflation.
    • ESL Contribution: If we conservatively estimate that ESL makes up around 10-20% of educational costs for illegal aliens (a rough estimate based on the significant need for language acquisition services), we could estimate:
      • 10% of $59 billion (adjusted for inflation and population growth) = approximately $5.9 billion to $11.8 billion.

However, taking into account:

  • The reports from various cities like Chicago and New York City, where specific ESL costs for migrant students were in the range of $120 million to several hundred million annually for those cities alone.
  • The national scale and the fact that these costs have likely risen with increased immigration numbers, especially given sanctuary policies and more inclusive educational policies in some states.

A more realistic estimate for the national cost of ESL programs for illegal aliens in 2024 could be:

  • Between $10 billion to $20 billion.

This range accounts for the known costs, the scale of the problem, and the fact that ESL services are critical and widespread in areas with high concentrations of non-English speaking immigrant populations. Remember, this is an estimate based on the available data and trends; actual figures could vary due to numerous variables like policy changes, local budget decisions, and the exact number of ESL students.

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Deportation Logistics

Operation Wetback

Operation Wetback, initiated in 1954 under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, aimed to deport unauthorized immigrants, primarily from Mexico. The exact number of deportations during this operation is a subject of debate among historians due to discrepancies in official claims and actual recorded deportations:

  • Official Claims: The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) claimed that approximately 1.1 million to 1.3 million people were deported or left voluntarily under threat of deportation during the operation.
  • Historical Disputes: Historians like Kelly Lytle Hernandez have argued that the actual number of deportations was significantly lower, possibly closer to 300,000, pointing out that the INS figures included many who left voluntarily and might have been counted multiple times due to recidivism.
  • Other Estimates: Some analyses suggest the number could be anywhere between 300,000 to 800,000.

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US Personnel

During Operation Wetback in 1954, the number of law enforcement personnel involved was relatively small considering the scale of the operation:

  • Border Patrol Agents: The operation began with approximately 750 Border Patrol agents, immigration officers, and investigators. This number includes those directly involved in the field operations.
  • Additional Support: The operation also utilized military-style tactics, involving coordination with local law enforcement and the use of various forms of transportation like buses, cars, and even planes for deporting individuals. While exact numbers for additional support personnel like local law enforcement are not precisely documented, the operation was noted for its use of about 300 jeeps, cars, buses, and 7 airplanes, suggesting a broader logistical support network.

Thus, the core group directly involved in the deportation process was around 750 personnel, though the total number of law enforcement and support staff might have been higher due to local cooperation and the use of military equipment and personnel for logistical support.

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Fast Forward to the present where I asked Grok:

How many people are employed in DHS, CBP, FBI and other immigration services

Here’s a breakdown of the employment numbers for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other related immigration services based on the most recent data available:

  • Department of Homeland Security (DHS): DHS employs around 260,000 employees across its various components.
  • U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP): CBP has a workforce of over 60,000 employees, including officers, agents, agriculture specialists, and support staff.
  • Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): The FBI has about 35,000 employees, which includes both agents and support personnel.
  • Other Immigration Services:
    • U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE): Although specific recent numbers for ICE alone are not provided in the search results, it’s part of DHS, and its workforce contributes to the overall DHS employee count. ICE includes enforcement and removal operations, which would overlap with immigration enforcement activities.
    • U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS): While exact numbers for 2025 aren’t detailed, USCIS is known to have a significant workforce focusing on immigration benefits adjudication, which would add to the DHS total.

These numbers give an approximate idea of the personnel involved in these agencies:

  • DHS Total: 260,000
  • CBP: 60,000+
  • FBI: 35,000
  • ICE and USCIS: These are included in the DHS total but not broken down individually in the provided data.

Thus, the total number of employees across these entities would be significantly influenced by the DHS total, with specific contributions from CBP and FBI. However, for a precise count of all involved in immigration services, one would need to consider the overlapping roles within DHS components.

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Joe Biden had our CBP personnel making sandwiches for illegal aliens. The Democrat party wants illegal voters and the Republican party wants cheap labor. Americans want our country back: we can no longer afford the government’s attempts to bankrupt our country, our culture and our livelihood.

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It’s Not Hard to Help the People

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The Spiral Case

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Have You Noticed?

I went to Walmart tonight and the parking lot was about 40% less crowded than I have ever seen. We then went into town and found multiple parking spaces on main street. I have not seen that in over eight years. As a friend told me tonight: We have a real President again.

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Trump Sends the Army Corps of Engineers to WNC

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